Thank you
for posting your response to my criticism of fallacy CB400
on the June 2004 board. Let me try to explain the inherent
contradiction more clearly. I apologize in advance for the
length, which may preempt you from posting it, but I think
my brevity last time preempted you from fully understanding
my claim.
Either freedom is a biochemical event (i.e., reducible
to one form or another of biochemistry) or it is not.
Let's suppose that freedom is a biochemical event
resulting from a biochemical history (which is the position
of evolutionary theory). If freedom is a biochemical event,
it must "obey" or operate according to biochemical laws. If
it operates according to biochemical laws, it cannot
actually be free, being wholly determined by the laws which
govern its operation. (I.e., predetermining Laws exclude
Freedom.) If freedom does not operate according to
biochemical laws, it is not an inherently biochemical
event.
Let us assume that freedom is not an inherently
biochemical event, or is not wholly determined by
biochemistry. What becomes of the evolutionary supposition
that there are only physical (general) and biochemical
(specific) events and the laws that govern them? Isn't the
introduction of freedom into the universe an admission that
the universe is not entirely governed by physical laws? If
so, how does evolutionary theory buttress the claim that
all events are physical events? And how do
not-entirely-physical realities come from physical
ones?
And if freedom is not essentially a biochemical event,
what is it? If you mean to say that freedom, fundamentally,
is like everything else in the universe and operates
according to physical or mathematical laws, why do you call
it "free"? What does it mean to say that a determined event
is a free one?
That is the argument in a nutshell. But supposing it is
an untrue argument, you would at least have to admit that
the introduction of actual freedom (the ability to elude
being wholly determined by this or that physical law) into
evolutionary theory directly contradicts the evolutionary
claim that all events are inherently physical (and
therefore wholly determined). Or wouldn't you? Can you a
explain how it is possible in principle that an organism
that has something that is beyond physical determination
can still be considered essentially physical / empirical?
How will evolutionary theory (which only admits the
existence of the physical and physical laws) quantify or
register the existence of something that partially
transcends the physical? I do not mean, "How is freedom
more complex than, say, dirt or the liver?" I mean, how can
there be anything in an inherently governed universe which
is not itself entirely governed?
Your counterargument relies on the analogy of size,
which is a false analogy in this case. "Large" can be
extrapolated from "small," and in fact, it is impossible to
speak of "small" without implying "large" (else, what are
we comparing the small thing to to determine that it is
small?). "Biochemistry / physical determination" and
"freedom" do not even suggest one another, much less are
they inherently related--i.e., the universe for all we know
is a purely physical universe with only the illusion of
freedom presented to some of its distinct entities, which
means we can conceive of a physical universe that has no
freedom. "Small" necessitates the existence of "large," and
vice versa. "Determination" necessitates the non-existence
of anything that does not act according to
determination--such as freedom.
And the analogy turns back on you: if you were right,
then saying that you can extrapolate freedom--which is to
say, the ability to defy determination--from biochemistry
(which is to say, determination) is like saying that one
can extrapolate "large" from a system which is by
definition small and completely determined by smallness.
How are you justified in extrapolating a system that at
least partially defies determination from a system which is
inherently determined?
You made a rather incredible claim: you said that such
synergetic effects as the movement from total physical
determination to the ability to be not wholly physically
determined do happen. Could you point to such a documented
(not to mention perfectly huge) transition as would compare
well with the one we're discussing? Don't tell me that you
have an instance wherein a simple thing became a complex
thing. Tell me how a thing transcended the laws by which it
was brought into existence. As I'm sure you can see at a
glance, anybody's skepticism in such a claim would have to
be extreme. I have never seen, nor can I logically think it
feasible that I shall ever see such a contradiction
occur.
I think your last paragraph is irrelevant. Starting with
"Probably you believe" you argue that evolutionary theory
explains "animation"--which I do not here argue with (I do,
in fact, believe in most of the tenets of evolutionary
theory). I am not arguing that evolutionary theory cannot
explain living organisms. I am arguing that it cannot
explain free ones without tearing up its crucially held
principle that all events are determined by certain laws; I
am arguing that *freedom* is not a theoretical or actual
possibility in a system which, by definition, is wholly
determined. You evolutionists seem to be arguing that the
physical order is both only physical and somehow capable of
defying physical determination (in the form of freedom).
Evolutionary critics like myself and Johnson are only
pointing out the inherent logical contradiction in that
claim. If you can show that the contradiction is rather a
paradox, I'd be glad to know how that is possible. But
again, you're up against trying to prove that some X--which
is by definition denied in Y--can be extracted from Y or
result from Y. What unknown Z can make Y not just Y but
also not-Y in the same way, to the same degree, and at the
same time?
Tobias